swap r 1 and r 3 swap r 2 and r 3 R 2 (0) = {r 3 } R 2 r 1 r 2 r 3 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
. . .
Argument: deduction tree
Attacks comes from the contraries:
ag 1 wants r 1 and r 3 r 1 and r 3 can be swapped
ag 2 has r 3 , ag 1 has r 1 + r 2 , r 2 ↔ r 3 ag 2 has r 3 ⊤ r 2 ↔ r 3 r 1 ↔ r 3 Realisation of the minimal concession strategy optimal ← loc(assert), ll(none)
optimal ← loc(reply), ll(assert)
optimal ← loc(concede), d(x, y ), ll(reply),
optimal ← loc(standstill), ll(standstill),
Properties

Theorem (Termination)
The dialogues are finite.
Claim (Success/Optimality) If both of the players adopt a MC strategy and a potential agreement exists, then the dialogue is a success the outcome is Pareto optimal
Warning (Non-incentive)
The dialogue is not in a pure symmetric Nash equilibrium.
